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This paper develops an empirical method to identify the price effects of simultaneous 
mergers and to separate the different effects on the prices of the buyer and seller firms and 
on the prices of their respective competitors. Our difference-in-differences approach 
exploits variation in the presence of merging firms across local markets to form different 
treatment-control group pairs in order to estimate separate effects for each type of firms 
affected by the mergers.  
We apply this method to provide an ex post evaluation of two almost simultaneous 
mergers in the Hungarian retail gasoline market. We show that both mergers resulted in a 
significantly positive but economically negligible price effect, but while the first merger 
affected only the prices of buyer firm's stations, the second had an effect on the prices of 
seller's stations and of its competitors. We also demonstrate that the results are not 
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Összefonódások ex post hatásainak szeparálása: 
magyar benzinpiaci strukturális változások 
értékelése 
 




A tanulmány az azonos időben történő összefonódások árhatásainak identifikálására, az 
összefonódásoknak a felvásárló, a felvásárolt vállalat és versenytársaik áraira gyakorolt 
hatásainak szeparálására ad egy empirikus módszert. Panelbecslési megközelítésünk a 
fuzionáló cégek különböző piaci jelenlétét használja fel az egyes lokális piacokon ahhoz, 
hogy különböző kontrollcsoportokat alkosson, és így szeparálni tudja a különböző 
hatásokat. 
Ezt a módszert a magyar benzinpiacon végbement két összefonódás ex post értékelésére 
használjuk fel. Kimutatjuk, hogy mindkét fúziónak pozitív hatása volt az árakra, de ennek 
nagysága elhanyagolható volt. Ugyanakkor az egyik fúziónak csak a felvásárló vállalat 
áraira volt hatása, míg a másik esetében a hatás kimutatható a felvásárolt cég és 
versenytársainak áraiban. Ezek az eredmények nem érzékenyek arra, hogy mely időponttól 
tételezzük fel, hogy a fúziók ténylegesen megváltoztatják a vállalatok árazási politikáját. 
 




JEL kódok: D43, L13, L49 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the late 1990s, there has been a growing need to evaluate the performance of 
antitrust policies, and especially whether mergers contributed to the observed price 
increases in their respective industries.1 The goal of ex post merger evaluation is to 
identify the price change due to the merger itself and separate it from the price effect of 
any other economic factors such as changes in demand and cost conditions. The central 
question of most previous studies was to find the total (average) price effect attributed to 
the merger, but less attention has been given to analyzing the difference in the effects a 
merger can have on the various firms affected by the mergers. In this paper, we develop an 
empirical method to identify the price effects of simultaneous mergers, and break down 
the total effect of each merger by separating the effects on the prices of the buyer and seller 
firms and on the prices of their respective competitors. 
Figure 1 illustrates the eight different merger effects we aim to separate in our ex post 
evaluation of two mergers. 
Figure 1. 
The different merger effects to separate 
 
                                                        
1 See the LEAR (2006) report prepared for the DG Competition European Commission, Office of 
Fair Trading and Competition Commission (2005) and contributions to the "Measuring the 
Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement" conference organized by the Dutch 
Competition Authority (NMa) in 2007, which were published in the December 2008 issue of De 
Economist. 
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Our method of separating these effects enables us the testing of some important 
predictions of academic and antitrust literature, which argue that a merger can result in 
different price changes for different firms, depending on their role in the merger. First, the 
most robust prediction is that a merger will result in a larger change in merging firms' 
pricing than in competitor firms' pricing as the former can fully internalize the effect of 
eliminating the competitive constraint (externality) the two firms had on each other before 
the merger.2 Second, in mergers with local markets, a larger price increase is expected on 
markets where both merging firms are present (or are closer competitors to each other), 
since the merger removes a direct competitive constraint between their respective 
outlets.3 Third, a merger might have a different effect on the two firms involved, as the 
business policies and supply conditions of the firms will likely converge towards each 
other, and the change is usually conjectured to be larger for the case of the acquired firm 
than for the buyer firm.4 
                                                       
In this paper, we provide an ex post assessment of two mergers on the Hungarian retail 
gasoline markets, which happened almost simultaneously: the acquisition of Jet by Lukoil 
in February 2007 and the acquisition of Esso by Agip in July 2007.5 Our detailed panel on 
station-level prices offers an intuitive way to estimate the price effects of the two mergers 
with difference-in-differences methods, where we exploit the variation in the presence of 
merging firms across local markets. Because we observe almost all possible combinations 
of the four firms' stations in distinct local markets, we can form different treatment-
control group pairs to identify separate effects for each merging firm and their 
competitors.6 
As a preliminary illustration of our results, Table 1 shows the mergers' partial effects on 
the retail prices of different parties, estimated under the initial assumption that the change 
in the firms' pricing policies all took place in January 2008.7 
 
2 See the classical Davidson and Deneckere (1985) price competition model with differentiated 
products or Vives (1999) on more general results in various oligopolistic settings. 
3 Levy and Reitzes (1992) develop a merger model of spatially differentiated firms leading to this 
result. 
4 Although there is no theoretical model backing this last result, this conjecture is based on the 
fact that it is usually the management of the buyer firm that takes over the business and pricing 
decisions of the acquired firm. We can also have more reason to believe that the buyer firm 
already had a more successful business strategy in place. 
5 Both mergers were of moderate size, the fifth and fourth biggest firm taking over the stations of 
the seventh and sixth firm, respectively. 
6 For this reason, our methodology cannot be used for the ex post evaluation of a merger affecting 
all (product or geographical) markets in the same way, or when there are too few distinct 
markets. 
7 The positive elements are parameters significant even at 1%, zero elements indicate parameters 
that are not significant at 5%. 
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Table 1.  
Illustrative results for separate merger effects 
 Agip/Esso  Lukoil/Jet 
Own effect on buyer firm's stations  0  +0.8% 
Own effect on acquired firm's stations  +0.7%  0 
Competitor effect on stations in buyer's vicinity  0  0 
Competitor effect on stations in acquirer's vicinity  +0.5% 0 
 
Our first result is that neither merger contributed substantially to retail price increases, 
as all estimated price changes are less than one percent. Second, both mergers had 
different effects on the prices of the firms depending on their role in the merger and the 
differences are mostly in line with the theoretical predictions given before. For the 
Agip/Esso merger, there are significant effects on the pricing of the acquired Esso stations 
and their competitors, and the price change is larger at Esso stations than at competitors' 
stations (although the difference is not significant). For the Lukoil/Jet merger, we also find 
that own effects are larger than competitor effects, but a significant effect is found only for 
the buying firm's stations. These different patterns of price effects for the two mergers may 
be explained by the difference in the merging firms' pricing policies and possible efficiency 
effects. 
Unfortunately, the date when a merger effectively has an actual economic effect on the 
respective firms (the so-called effective merger date) is usually unknown to researchers, 
and changes in pricing policies might even be gradual. Therefore, great care should be 
taken when selecting the effective merger date to use in estimating the price effects of 
mergers, as this choice my have large impact on results. We apply several methods to show 
that the qualitative results discussed above emerge robustly when different effective 
merger dates are assumed. The magnitude of the estimated effects can change, but the 
estimated price changes due to the two mergers always remain negligible. 
OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The number of ex post merger evaluations (or so called merger retrospectives) has been 
growing considerably since 2000, partly because of an increased need to evaluate the 
performance of antitrust policies.8 The principal statistical method used in these studies 
                                                        
8 Weinberg (2008) and Hunter et al (2008) provide two comprehensive reviews on ex post merger 
evaulations. Weinberg also discusses alternative methods to difference-in differences 
estimations. 
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was difference-in-differences estimation, as is typical in program evaluation literature.9 
These ex post evaluations mostly studied transactions in industries with high merger 
activity, where price changes affected a wide range of consumers (and interested a lot of 
politicians and policy makers): hospital services,10 airline ticketing,11 banking products, 
basic consumer goods (typically food),12 and gasoline. 
Gasoline markets have always received attention, in particular during the recent years 
of large price changes, as fluctuations in petroleum prices were often followed by quick 
reactions in retail prices. Therefore, it was questioned whether the changes in wholesale 
conditions offered the only plausible explanation or whether certain anticompetitive 
practices also played a role.13 A restructuring has taken place in many countries by a 
series of acquisitions on all supply levels, and therefore it is crucial to determine how the 
price effects of changes in wholesale conditions can be separated from changes in retail 
market structure.14 Mergers involving companies with production facilities have always 
received more attention because of their ability to affect wholesale prices, but retail 
mergers are typically easier to analyze due to the availability of a larger amount of more 
transparent price data and variation in local market structure. 
                                                       
A widely-cited paper by Hastings (2004) uses a simple difference-in-differences 
estimator to analyze how the acquisition of an independent station network by a branded 
network affected local retail prices in different geographic areas. She finds that removing 
an independent station raises retail prices significantly, but the increase in the share of 
branded (so called company-operated) stations alone does not explain higher prices. 
Hastings thus concludes that the identity of competitors is as important as their number in 
determining market conduct, which she interprets as support for a model with some 
product differentiation and brand loyalty on retail gasoline markets.15 However, Hastings 
analyzes only the change in the pricing of competing stations to derive conclusions on the 
 
9 Imbens and Wooldrige (2009) give a detailed general review on the methodological problems 
arising in program evaluation. 
10 See Farrell et al (2009) for a recent overview on hospital merger retrospectives. 
11 See Armantier and Richard (2008). 
12 See Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) for the ex post evaluation of five mergers in this sector. 
13 See for example the questions raised by the US Congress to the Federal Trade Commission in 
2004. The summary of the FTC's view can be found at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gastest2.shtm 
14 The US Government Accountability Office reports 2600 mergers in the petroleum industry from 
1990 till 2004. The GAO's econometric models analyzed the effects of the eight biggest 
transactions in detail. The report can be downloaded from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
04-96 
15 This paper was criticized by Taylor et al (2010) both from a theoretical and empirical point of 
view. They failed to reproduce her results by using alternative data and also showed that her 
empirical result would not lead to unambiguous welfare effects in the underlying model she 
assumes. 
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effect of the merger,16 while theory suggests – and our paper also demonstrates – that the 
change in the pricing of acquired stations may be larger. 
Taylor and Hosken (2007) use an approach similar to Hastings's in measuring the 
effect of a joint venture, but find no retail price increases resulting from the change in 
market structure.17 The paper also illustrates some important implications for further ex 
post reviews: (1) it is more important to analyze the merger effects on retail prices than 
rack (wholesale) prices, (2) variation in gasoline supply should be taken into account 
whenever possible, and (3) the estimated effects can depend on the control regions used, 
therefore robustness checks are crucial when selecting the counterfactual.18 The 
substantive difference between Taylor and Hosken's paper and ours is that while Taylor 
and Hosken examine the overall effect of the merger on city-level (average) prices, our 
paper takes a further step by separating the different effects a merger may have on various 
market players in each market.  
The few studies analyzing the merger effects on rivals' prices used it to answer different 
research questions than we do. Kim and Singal (1993) find larger price effects for 
competitor airlines than for the merging airlines, which they attribute to merger-specific 
efficiencies passed on to consumers. In studying hospital mergers, Dafny (2009) argues 
that researchers should look at the effect on competitor prices particularly if it can be 
conjectured that the merger event might be correlated with the unobserved characteristics 
of the acquired hospitals, in order to avoid selection bias. However, as we have already 
mentioned, if there are no efficiencies realized by the merger, then these outsider effects 
provide only a lower bound for the insider effects.  
STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON THE HUNGARIAN RETAIL GASOLINE 
MARKET 
The Hungarian retail gasoline market is moderately concentrated, with five main 
international oil companies (Hungary-based MOL, OMV, Shell, Agip (Eni) and Lukoil) 
owning almost 75% of petrol stations and likely accounting for an even higher share of 
revenues. MOL's market share is the largest in terms of stations and it also has a leading 
role at the wholesale level with an upstream market share of at least 70%. 
                                                        
16 Not enough data was available on the acquired stations, as this was a random sample on prices 
in which minor brands and independent stations were underrepresented. 
17 Another merger concerning the same firm Marathon-Ashland was similarly analyzed by 
Simpson and Taylor (2008), and this study found no ex post evidence of a price increase either. 
18 Choné and Linnemer (2010) also use various local market definitions in order to find the robust 
ex post effect of a merger between two large parking companies. 
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In 2007, Agip and Lukoil acquired all retail stations of the other two international oil 
companies present in Hungary, Esso (Exxon) and Jet (ConocoPhillips) respectively. Both 
acquisitions were part of large transactions involving business activities in multiple 
countries.19 Table 2 summarizes the key facts concerning the two mergers. 
Table 2. 
Summary of the two mergers analyzed 
  Agip/Esso20 Lukoil/Jet21 
Case number  COMP/M.4723  COMP/M.4532 
Stations sold in 
countries 
Belgium, Czech Republic, 




Number of stations 
and market shares in 
Hungary 
102 (9%) / 36 (3%)  42 (4%) / 30 (3%) 
Transaction date  27-04-2007  18-12-2006 
Notification date  19-06-2007  17-01-2007 
Clearance date  24-07-2007  21-02-2007 
First public sign of 
change in Hungary  November 2007  November 2007 
 
Note that before receiving the clearance decision, the merging companies should act 
independently of each other. However, the change in business and pricing policies due to 
the merger usually takes place some months after the clearance, but this so-called effective 
merger date is not publicly known. The only publicly observable fact in our case is the date 
when the acquiring firms started repainting the acquired stations to their brand colors, 
which happened in November 2007 for both mergers. 
Apart from the branded stations mentioned, the remaining 25% of stations are owned 
by a large number of small competitors. Only three chains had a larger than 1% market 
share based on the number of its stations in the relevant period of 2007-2008, and all 
three faced major changes during this time. The previously largest entrant Tesco continued 
to build new stations till the end of 2008.22 The alliance of independent (white) stations 
Klub Petrol exited the market at the end of 2007 due to financial difficulties. Finally, a new 
alliance of independent (white) stations named Avia entered in 2008; several former Klub 
Petrol stations joined this alliance. 
                                                        
19 For this reason, the mergers were notified to the European Commission, which investigated and 
cleared them in quick Phase I investigations. 
20  The publicly available decision can be downloaded from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4723_20070724_20310_en.pdf 
21 The publicly available decision can be downloaded from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4532_20070221_20310_en.pdf 
22 Later in 2009, Tesco stations were acquired by Shell. This long-term lease agreement was 
cleared by the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH), case number Vj-17/2009. 
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The evolution of the relevant firms' shares in station numbers is summarized in Table 
3. 
Table 3. 
Changes in station shares in 2007-2008 
  Station shares 2007-01  Station shares 2008-12 
MOL 29%  28% 
Shell 16%  15% 
OMV 14%  13% 
Agip 9% 
Esso 3%  12% 
Lukoil 4% 
Jet 3%  7% 
Tesco 3%  4% 
Klub Petrol  3%  0% 
Avia 0  3% 
Other stations23 16%  18% 
Total station number  1229  1335 
 
PRICE DATA AND STYLIZED PRICE DEVELOPMENTS 
We analyze a panel database containing daily retail gasoline prices in from the beginning 
of January 2007 till the end of December 2008. The database contains the price of 95-
octane gasoline only, but 96% of gasoline sales are of this type. The source of our data is a 
public website helping consumers to compare gasoline prices: www.holtankoljak.hu 
(Where Should I Refuel?), run by a private company.24 We will analyze retail prices on 
Fridays, as the Hungarian wholesale price changes each Wednesday morning,25 and 
therefore most retail price changes occur on Wednesday and Thursday.26 In total, we have 
81253 price observations in 96 weeks for 1303 gas stations, more than 95% of stations in 
                                                        
23 The number of independent white pumps is slightly uncertain, as their presence is not properly 
reported at the beginning of the observation period. 
24 The company conducting the price comparisons is independent of the retail firms, and is 
financed by online advertisements placed primarily by car manufacturers and insurance 
companies. 
25 Strictly speaking this is only the price change of the dominant wholesale company (Hungary-
based firm MOL), but it supplies at least 70-80% of gasoline sold in Hungary. The change in the 
wholesale price is made public the previous Monday. 
26 Data gathered is based on the self-reporting of the stations by phone, and the biggest inquiry 
conducted is on Wednesday and Thursday. Therefore the Friday data are expected to be the 
most accurate, and we also have the most observations for Fridays. 
  12  
Hungary.27 The panel is unbalanced, but the majority missing data corresponds to the 
fringe white stations that are less relevant for our analysis.  
In the observed period, the price of gasoline fluctuated between 230 and 310 
Hungarian Forints (HUF), with an average of 281 HUF.28 In order to filter out common 
shocks (particularly the change of the wholesale price), Figure 2 below shows the 
differences between firm-specific average price and the national average price. Note that 
here the brand of the station refers to its original brand at the beginning of the observation 
period before either merger, so there is no composition effect in the changes. 
Figure 2. 










































These price differences show that the three largest firms (MOL, OMV and Shell) were 
able to maintain slightly higher prices then their competitors,29 and Agip's prices 
gradually became closer to them in 2008. There is also a visible change in the pricing of 
Esso stations acquired by Agip in the middle of 2007, as their prices increased from the 
                                                        
27 The missing stations are all white stations or belong to small brands with few stations. Price 
data are not reported for 8 weeks, which was because of holiday periods and a shutdown 
problem of the website. 
28 The exchange rate also fluctuated during these two years, but one can make easy conversions 
with the approximation of 250 HUF = 1 Euro. 
29 The graph shows the average of the top 3 firms' prices together as no substantial differences can 
be observed between their average prices. 
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level of low-pricing firms to the national average. On the other hand, Lukoil and Jet 
stations appear to have maintained their low-pricing policies, although Lukoil's prices 
increased slightly starting from the second part of 2007. 
Although we cannot observe the individual costs of retail firms, we do have a good 
proxy for the wholesale price of gasoline we can use. Each Monday, the change in MOL's 
wholesale list price becomes publicly known, and as MOL serves most retailers and has 
significant market power upstream, we believe that the change of this wholesale price can 
serve as a good indicator of the change in marginal costs. Therefore, we will refer to MOL's 
wholesale list price as the wholesale price, and define the margin of a brand or station as 
the simple difference of the respective retail price and the wholesale price. The average 
margin varies between 10 and 18 HUF with an average of 15 HUF, which is about 5% of the 
retail price. 
We should note that both the retail prices observed at the stations and the wholesale 
price are only list prices, while most retailers offer loyalty discounts in the form of loyalty 
cards or fleet programs. If larger retailers offer larger discounts,30 the actual price 
differences between smaller and larger retailers might be smaller than shown in Figure 2. 
Similarly, at the wholesale level retailers receive individual discounts from the list price, 
which are not observed. However, assuming the size of these discounts remains stable over 
the observed period, these measurement errors are mostly taken care of by the difference-
in-differences estimation method we use. Of course, it might be the case that a merged 
firm achieves a larger quantity discount due to increased sales or changes its consumer 
discount policy, but this change will be captured by our estimated merger-specific effects. 
 
LOCAL MARKETS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL COMPETITION 
In order to analyze the effect of structural changes on local prices, we should first define 
the areas where a given station's pricing policy might constrain other stations' pricing, and 
therefore a structural change concerning the given station would have an effect on the 
other stations. This approach to delineating local markets is very similar to the usual first 
step in competition policy of "defining the relevant markets", where  the competitive 
assessment should be carried out.31 
                                                        
30 This conjecture is hard to test correctly, because the discounts often do not take the form of a 
direct price decrease for gasoline, but for example bonus points (price discounts) for shop 
purchases. 
31 Note, however, that competition policy cases analyzing retail gasoline markets took a rather 
conservative approach by defining the relevant geographical market as national. It was only in a 
recent merger case in 2008 where DG Competition took the view that although the market is 
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In this paper, we use an economically reasonable proxy for local markets:32 the 168 
statistical municipalities defined by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH). These 
statistical municipalities are delineated by various survey techniques as distinct 
geographical areas where inhabitants perform the majority of their social and economic 
activities (such as traveling, working and shopping), so it seems reasonable to assume that 
consumers shop around primarily in this area and retailers consider the stations in the 
municipality as their main local competitors.33 It might be of course the case that two 
competitors in the same local area do not exert the same degree of competitive pressure on 
a given station due to the varying distance between the stations, but further station-level 
controls in our estimations can partially take care of this problem. 
An alternative way to delineate local markets would be to define a catchment area 
around each station, in which the given station provides a viable alternative to consumers 
visiting the other stations.34 Note, however, that the choice of driving time / distance used 
in these delineations remains arbitrary, and the stations falling in the same catchment area 
are still assumed to exert the same competitive constraint – so the shortcomings of the 
previous approach are not completely solved.35 However, it can be useful to carry out this 
more tedious exercise in order to test the sensitivity of the estimation results to differently 
delineated local markets. 
We do not include gasoline stations located on highways in our analysis, because 
substitution possibilities and therefore competitive conditions are markedly different at 
these stations.36 The capital of Hungary (Budapest) with its 183 stations is defined as one 
statistical municipality, and therefore this outlier is also excluded. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
defined as national, the competitive assessment should take local aspects into account – see 
COMP/M.4723 StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips decision §26-29, downloadable from 
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4723_20070724_20310_en.pdf 
32 L o c a l  m a r k e t s  w e r e  a l s o  d e f i n e d  i n  s e v e r a l  p a p e r s  b y  t a k i n g  s o m e  k i n d  o f  a r t i f i c i a l  p r o x y .  
Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) for example use the regional economic areas defined by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to delineate cement markets in the USA; Focarelli and 
Panetta (2003) and Sapienza (2002) delineate Italian provinces as relevant geographic markets 
for bank deposits. 
33 There are two further practical advantage of using statistical municipalities. First, the ZIP code 
of each station can be automatically linked to a municipality, which ensures that local markets 
do not overlap and their number can be kept at a tractable level. Second, the Statistical Office 
also discloses economic indicators (such as population, number of cars, taxable income) for each 
of them, which can be used to control for local differences in our estimations. 
34 For example, Hastings (2004) uses circles of a one-mile radius around each gasoline station, but 
estimates some of her results by using different r a d i u s e s .  I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t o  w o r k  w i t h  
d i f f e r e n t  m e a s u r e s  o f  d i s t a n c e s ,  l i k e  t r a v e l i n g  t i m e ,  w h i c h  i s  m o r e  t y p i c a l  i n  a n a l y z i n g  
supermarket mergers for example (see for example Ashenfelter et al (2006)). 
35 Note also that distance might not be the only source of horizontal differentiation between 
stations. 
36 In Hungary, highways can be entered only after paying the toll, and exits can be quite far from 
each other. Therefore it seems unlikely consumers would enter and exit the highway for the sake 
of a potentially lower pump price. The average price at petrol stations on highways is only 3-4% 
higher than at other stations, but we see a slightly different trend in highway prices than in off-
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Descriptive statistics of the remaining 167 statistical municipalities seem to indicate 
oligopilistic market structures with a few market players, which might signal that these 
municipalities constitute indeed a good approximation of local markets.37 The average 
number of differently branded stations (major firms) in a local market is 3.2 (standard 
deviation 1.8), while the average number of stations in a local market is 6.3 (standard 
deviation 6.7).38 
On top of the variance between the average characteristics of local markets, the major 
firms are also differently distributed among these markets, and it is this variance in market 
structure that we will heavily exploit. Table 4 and 5 illustrates the overlap of the merging 
firms in local markets and shows a different geographical pattern emerge for the two 
mergers to be analyzed. 
Table 4. 
Number of local markets where Agip and Esso are present 
 Esso  present  Esso not present  Total 
Agip present  12  52  64 
Agip not present  4  96  87 
Total 16  135   
Table 5. 
Number of local markets where Lukoil and Jet are present 
 Jet  present  Jet not present  Total 
Lukoil present  6  32  38 
Lukoil not present  11  115  113 
Total 17  134   
 
Esso stations acquired by Agip were direct competitors of Agip in 75% of the local 
markets where Esso is present, while this overlap is only 35% for the Lukoil/Jet merger. 
On the other hand, the acquisition of Jet stations increased Lukoil's presence on local 
markets by almost 30%, but this expansion is only 6% for Agip. Therefore, the acquisition 
of Esso can be seen more as a merger with a direct competitor, while the Lukoil/Jet merger 
                                                                                                                                                                          
highway prices. Because of these facts, it is usual to define gasoline stations on highways as 
different geographical markets. 
37 Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) studied oligopolistic markets with entry costs and analyzed the 
relationship between local market size and the number of sellers (see also Campbell and 
Hopenhayn (2005)), and they found similar distributions of firms in some industries to ours - 
see especially the distribution of automobile dealers in their Table 2, which probably has the 
closest connection to the gasoline market in their sample. We can also check in our case that the 
number of firms is strongly correlated with indicators proxying local market size (0.96 with 
taxable income, 0.97 with population). 
38 Note that firms (brands) can have multiple stations in some local markets (usually in the larger 
ones), and we include white stations as well when looking for the total number of stations. 
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resulted more in market expansion. This may lead to a conjecture of a larger price effect 
resulting from the Agip/Esso merger, which may look consistent with the evolution of 
average prices at the firm-level presented on Figure 2. 
However, the analysis of descriptive data can give only preliminary conjectures on 
merger effects. Definitive results can only be obtained by the thorough analysis of changes 
in local prices while controlling for other factors affecting the prices. 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD AND IDENTIFICATION OF EX POST MERGER 
EFFECTS 
Our main aim is to differentiate and estimate eight types of price effects resulting from the 
two mergers, as demonstrated at Figure 1 in the Introduction. First, we separate the price 
effects of the two mergers (Agip/Esso and Lukoil/Jet effects). Second, we separate the 
price effects associated with the two different parties in each merger (buyer and seller 
effects). Third, for each merger we differentiate between the direct effects of the merger on 
the prices of the buyer and seller (buyer and seller own effect) and the indirect effect on the 
prices of their respective competitors (buyer and seller competitor effect). At the end, four 
own effects correspond to the merging firms and four effects to their competitors. 
We believe that there are two reasons for the analyzed mergers to be considered good 
exogenous firm-specific shocks, whose effects can be therefore identified. First, the 
Hungarian acquisitions formed only small parts of larger transactions involving stations in 
multiple countries, and all Esso and Jet stations in Hungary were sold to their respective 
buyers. Both factors considerably decrease the chance for a selection bias. Second, the 
stations' individual prices are usually set at firms' headquarters, so it reasonable to assume 
the merger changes the pricing policy of the firm itself. We can then estimate the average 
change in the realized station-level prices after the adjustment took place.39 
We use a difference-in-differences method that compares pre- and post-merger price 
differentials between stations that were affec t e d  b y  t h e  m e r g e r  ( t r e a t m e n t  g r o u p )  a n d  
stations that were not (control group). The motivation behind such a comparison is that 
observations on unaffected stations can form a counterfactual by informing us about what 
would have happened to the merged stations had the merger not taken place. 
                                                        
39 A structural model of horizontal differentiation could for example lead to an equilibrium pricing 
condition for a firm that sets a uniform price P with the condition that any station should 
decrease its local price by X if firm A is present and Y if firm B is present. The merger can change 
the parameters in this equilibrium price setting rule to X' and Y', which could imply different 
price changes for two stations of the same firm, as they face different competitors on their local 
markets. 
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In order to implement this approach, we use a panel regression framework with station 
and time fixed effects. Our estimated equations will take the following general form: 
 
it t i it
Jet Lukoil Esso Agip j
jit j
Jet Lukoil Esso Agip j
jit j it v u controls competitor own y             
  , , .
2
, , .
1 ,        (1) 
 
where ￿sand ￿-s are parameters to be estimated, i indexes stations, t indexes time 
and j indexes the merging parties. Our dependent variable yit will be our main variable of 
interest, which can be the price or the price-cost difference in absolute (margin) or in 
relative terms (markup). Dummy variables ownjit capture the merger effect on merging 
parties and take the value of one after the merger treatment for the stations of each 
merging firm and zero otherwise. Variables competitorjit capture the merger effect on 
competitors and take the value of one if station i has merging party j as a competitor after 
the merger treatment and zero otherwise. Depending on additional data possibilities and 
considerations, we can add further variables (summarized now in controlsit) to the model 
to control for other factors than the merger that can affect price changes. Finally, the error 
component  i u  is the station fixed effect,  t v  is the time fixed effect and  it   is the 
disturbance term. 
Station fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity, which is important in our 
case because assignment to treatment and control status is not random, as it is the 
outcome of the decisions made by buyers Agip and Lukoil. Additionally, we do not fully 
observe all relevant characteristics of different stations and the size of local demand for 
gasoline. Time fixed effects control for changes in common unobservable variables to all 
stations in a given period.  
Station and time fixed effects also capture treatment-control group and merger date 
indicators, and merger effects will be captured by a cross-term generated as the product of 
the merger date indicator and the eight indicator variables for merging parties and their 
competitors. These cross-terms capture the change in the price difference between 
treatment and control stations, as station and time fixed effects basically transform the 
data into differences from the respective means. 
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FORMING TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS 
In the current context treatment and control groups can be formed based on the different 
presence of merging stations in local markets. For example, the Esso own merger effect 
can be identified based on the comparison of an Esso station’s price in a market where no 
other merging firm is present and the price of a station with no merging firm presence at 
all. We will use variation in the composition of merging firms in distinct local markets to 
form different treatment-control group pairs that identify each merger effect of interest. 
If the mergers represented an ideal experimental situation, then there would be 
distinct treatment and control groups for each effect being measured.40 This is not the case 
in our application, however, due to the presence of multiple merging parties in several 
local markets. For example, each Esso station is a member of the treatment group for the 
Esso own effect, but can be a member of several control (and even treatment) groups for 
Agip, Lukoil and Jet effects. For this reason, the aforementioned treatment-control pair for 
the identification of the Esso own effect is not the only source of identification: it is also 
identified by the differences between prices at Esso stations in markets where only Esso 
and Lukoil are both present (from the merging firms) and prices at stations in markets 
where only Lukoil is present from among the merging firms. Competitor effects are 
identified similarly to own effects.41 
In fact, for each merger effect there are eight possible presence combinations that can 
be used to form treatment groups. Of course, not all of these combinations are necessarily 
present in the sample. In order to give a precise picture of these sources of identification, 
Table 6 shows for the case of Esso the number of local markets and station-week 
observations in each treatment group and the corresponding control group. The 4-digit 
code indicates the respective presence of Agip, Esso, Lukoil and Jet stations in a local 
market, where 1 indicates the presence of respective firm and 0 its absence. For example, 
in control group 1010 Agip and Lukoil are present with Esso and Jet absent, and it 
corresponds to treatment group 1110 where one or more Esso stations are present as well. 
                                                        
40 This is the case for example in Prager and Hannan (1998) who compare interest rates of banks 
in regions where both merging firms compete to regions where they do not, or in Vita and 
Saches (2001) who compare hospitals with a similar number of beds, size and location differing 
only in whether they were present in a county where the merger occurred or not. 
41 For example, the Esso competitor effect is identified based on the price differences between 
Esso competitor stations in a market with only Esso present from among the merging firms and 
stations in markets where no merging firm is present. Identification is also based, however, on 
the differences between stations that are competitors of both Agip and Esso and stations that are 
only competitors of Agip. 
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Table 6. 
Treatment / control groups identifying Esso own and competitor effects 
Treatment Control 
Number of station-week 



















0100 3  214  2143  0000 75 21284 
1100 4 324  4035  1000 37 12359 
0110 0  0  0 0010  16 6,491 
0101  1 155  778  0001 4 2690 
1101 3 222  5079  1001  3  2548 
1110 2 257  3061  1010 10 3564 
0111 0  0  0 0011  1  496 
1111 3 240  6785  1011  2  1491 
Sum 16 1412  21881  Sum  135 43936 
 
There are eight possible subsets that include an Esso presence, but two of these subsets 
are not observed in the sample. All of the 16 markets where Esso is present also include 
other merging firms. It is not the number of markets, however, that identifies the 
difference-in-differences estimator but the number of station-week observations in these 
markets. There are 1412 such observations in the treatment group that we use to estimate 
the Esso own merger effect and 21881 for the Esso competitor effects,42 while the number 
of available controls is 43936 for both. 
Similarly, we can combine the 16 differently structured local markets to form 
treatment-control groups to separate the effects belonging to the other three merging 
firms. Table 7 summarizes the number of markets and station-week observations used for 
the identification of each merger effect. 
                                                        
42 The much larger number of observations to identify competitor effects might lead researchers to 
rely on them more in estimating merger effects (see for instance Hastings (2004)), but as we will 
see from our results, competitor effects are only a lower bound for own effects. 
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Table 7. 
Treatment and control groups identifying all own and competitor effects 
 
Treatment groups  Control groups 
No of stations-week 
observations 
 
No of local 




No of local 
markets 
No of stations-week 
observations 
Agip 59  6861 39830  92  36010 
Esso 16  1412 21881  135  43936 
Lukoil 34  3400  23002  117  53009 
Jet 17  1464  20690  134  60547 
 
ESTIMATED EX POST MERGER EFFECTS BY ASSUMING A KNOWN 
TREATMENT DATE 
When we estimate the price effects of mergers in this Section, we make an assumption on 
the exact time when the two mergers started to affect the pricing of each firm, and that it 
takes place as one discrete change with immediate effect for all firms. We set this so-called 
effective merger date at the first day of January 2008 for both mergers, implying that we 
have exactly one year before the treatment and after the treatment. In the next Section, we 
discuss how to relax this assumption and the effect is has on our results, and also explain 
why January 2008 can be a good candidate for both effective merger dates. 
We estimate the following version of Equation (1): 
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jit j
Jet Lukoil Esso Agip j
jit j it
v cm u type size size
competitor own y
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        (2) 
 
Although our main variable of interest is the price and the price effects, we will use the 
margin - the absolute difference of retail price and cost (wholesale price) - as our 
dependent variable. The main reason to do so is that prices are non-stationary while 
margins are, but we will show that running estimations on prices and controlling for costs 
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does not change our results considerably. However, with the margin as a the dependent 
variable, the estimated values of   can be still interpreted as price effects if the wholesale 
price does not change due to the merger. Even if the merger does affect the firm-specific 
wholesale price (due to a volume discount for example),43 the change in costs is passed on 
almost completely to retail prices (as our later estimations will show), so it can be 
interpreted as a price effect. 
We take into account changes in market structure other than the two mergers by 
including the number of stations ( it size  and also its square) and indicator variables for ten 
largest firms' presence in the same local market ( it type ) in the regressions. In order to 
control more strictly for common time variation we also use county-time fixed effects.44 
Table 8 shows our estimation results. Of the control variables, we only provide results 
for those that we interpret later. 45 
Table 8. 
Results of estimating Equation (2) 
Dependent variable  Margin (in 
HUF) 
Merger effects   
  Agip own  0.10 
  Agip competitor  0.15 
  Esso own  1.78** 
  Esso competitor  1.24** 
  Lukoil own  1.95** 
  Lukoil competitor  0.20 
  Jet own  -0.43 
  Jet competitor  0.00 
Controls (selected)   
  Tesco  -1.04** 
  Klub Petrol  -0.71** 
  Avia  0.48** 
  No of stations  0.08 






Within R2 0.2682 
      * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level  
 
                                                        
43 As we do not observe the firm-specific wholesale price at which the retailer buys the gasoline it 
resells, but only a publicly observable proxy, we cannot test this hypothesis. 
44 There are 19 counties in Hungary, each containing 8 local markets (municipalities) on average. 
45 The estimated controls for the presence of merging firms are not significant, so there is no need 
to correct the estimated merger effects accordingly. 
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The estimated merger effects are only significant for Lukoil and Esso. In order to see 
the magnitude of these price effects, we show the relative change in retail prices and firm-
level margins (in parentheses) in Table 9. 
Table 9. 
Relative price (margin) changes due to different merger effects 
 Agip/Esso  Lukoil/Jet 
Own effect on buyer firm's stations  0  +0.8% (+13.1%) 
Own effect on acquired firm's stations  +0.7% (+11.4%)  0 
Competitor effect on stations in buyer's vicinity  0  0 
Competitor effect on stations in acquirer's vicinity  +0.5% (+8.7%)  0 
 
The results show that both mergers had a positive but non-substantial effect on retail 
prices, as all significant effects are less than 2 HUF that is less than 1% of the average price. 
In terms of margins, however, the mergers provided a substantial change in Esso and 
Lukoil stations' margins and also for stations in Esso's vicinity. 
In line with our initial expectations, we see that both mergers resulted in different 
effects on the various firms, depending on their role in the merger. The Agip/Esso merger 
increased the prices of the seller's stations and also of their competitors, but the Lukoil/Jet 
merger had a positive effect on the prices of the buyer's stations only. Concerning the main 
theoretical prediction, the own effect is indeed significantly larger from the competitor 
effect in the case of the Lukoil/Jet merger. For the Agip/Esso merger, the point estimates 
also indicate a larger own effect than competitor effect, but this difference is not 
statistically significant. 
We can provide a possible economic interpretation of the two transactions that may 
also explain why different patterns emerge in the price effects of the two mergers. In the 
case of the Agip/Esso merger, it is likely that the acquisition of Esso did not change the 
potential competitive pressure on Agip from low-pricing brands,46 which can support why 
the Agip effects are not significant. On the other hand, the Esso stations became part of a 
larger firm with a reputation for higher quality, so the price increase on Esso stations (and 
therefore of its local competitors) can be likely attributed to an upwards brand 
repositioning of the Esso stations. 
The acquisition of Jet expanded Lukoil's presence and recognition considerably, 
providing a plausible explanation for the increase in Lukoil prices.47 However, no 
significant effect is found on the Jet stations, despite both firms having a similar pricing 
                                                        
46 As it can be computed from Table 6 listing the treatment and control groups, the low-pricing 
brands Lukoil or Jet are also present in 8 of the 12 markets where both Agip and Esso are 
present. 
47 Lukoil competitor effects are significant at the 10% level, but are non-substantial. 
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profile before the merger. A possible explanation could be that as Lukoil is a vertically 
integrated company and so the marginal cost of the Jet stations could have decreased 
because of the emerging self-supply opportunities. Therefore, an efficiency effect might 
have cancelled the otherwise positive price effect on Jet.48 
The difference-in-differences approach also allows us to interpret some of the control 
variables as the effects of actual entry and exit of stations during the observed period.49 
The parameter estimate of the Tesco dummy for example indicates that the entry of a 
Tesco station to a given local market decreased prices by 1 HUF. The parameter estimate 
for Klub Petrol should be interpreted as the exit of a Klub Petrol station increasing prices 
by 0.7 HUF. Surprisingly, the entry of an Avia station increased prices by 0.5 HUF, but as a 
good part of bankrupt Klub Petrol's stations joined the Avia alliance, they likely could not 
sustain the very low prices they charged before.50 A change in the number of stations in a 
given local market does not have a substantial price effect either (the squared variable is 
statistically significant, but very small).51 
 
SEPARATING THE EFFECT OF LOCAL COMPETITIVE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
MERGING PARTIES 
An additional important theoretical prediction to consider is that a merger may lead to 
larger price effects on those local markets where the two merging firms' stations were 
direct competitors of each other before the merger compared to those where only one was 
present. Testing this hypothesis requires the separation of yet another set of effects: eight 
effects if the respective firm is without its merging party ("alone") in the local market, and 
eight effects if both merging firms are present in the local market. 
Table 6 shows that there is enough variation in the composition of merging firms in 
distinct local markets for the formation of different treatment-control group pairs to 
identify each effect. We then estimate Equation (2) with sixteen treatments and report the 
                                                        
48 Unfortunately, our data does not allow to separate efficiency effects as we do not observe firm-
level costs (input price). 
49 Such methods are usually called event or shock analysis. Ashenfelter et al (2007) discuss the 
pros and cons of using these techniques by presenting the econometric methods used in the 
famous Office/Staples merger. For a more general overview, see Davis and Garces (2010, 
Chapter 5). 
50 When they were still active, the average price of Klub Petrol stations was 7 HUF below the 
average national level (Lukoil's and Jet's average prices were about 5 HUF below national 
average). 
51 In this price-concentration relationship, theory predicts that the entry of a new firm has a 
negative effect on price, but this price effect is smaller in absolute value when there are more 
firms on the market. So the parameter of station number is expected to be negative, but the 
parameter of the squared number is expected to be positive.  
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results in the first two columns of Table 10. The third column of Table 10 contains the 
effects without taking into account the sole or joint presence of merging firms (our first 
estimates from Table 8), which are naturally the weighted averages of parameters in the 
first and the second column. 
Table 10. 
Estimation results separated by sole/joint presence of merging firms 
  Effect if present alone  Effect if both present  Overall effect 
Agip own  0.23  -0.41  0,10 
Agip competitor  0.26  0.00  0,15 
Esso own  2.91**  1,25**  1,78** 
Esso competitor  1.57**  1.15**  1,24** 
Lukoil own  1.99**  1.54**  1,95** 
Lukoil competitor  0.26  0.00  0,20 
Jet own  -1.03  0.71  -0,43 
Jet competitor  0.17  0.01  0,00 
* significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level 
 
Our first result is that the set of significant effects does not change if we separate the 
effects by the sole and joint presence of the merging firms (Esso own and competitor 
effects and Lukoil own effect). Second, the parameter estimates for the respective effects 
are in most cases not statistically significant different from each other depending on 
whether only one or both merging firms are present, the exception being the Esso own 
effects and Jet own effects (the latter only at 10%). 
In the case of the Esso own effect, a significantly larger price effect can be observed for 
those Esso stations with no Agip stations in the same local market. While this result may 
seem counterintuitive at first, it can support our previous discussion that the price increase 
at Esso stations was not caused by the elimination of a previously existing competitive 
pressure between Agip and Esso. On the local markets where Agip was not present before, 
the larger change may well have been due to the emergence of a more recognized brand. 
In the case of Jet own effects, the point estimates show a negative effect on those 
markets where a Lukoil station was also present and a positive effect where there was not. 
This weakly significant difference is also consistent with the conjecture presented before 
that while the merger removed some competitive pressure exerted by Lukoil, Jet stations 
without the presence of Lukoil could have decreased their prices. Overall, the positive price 
effect was offset by an opposite effect that can be attributed to efficiencies. 
To sum up, the separation of effects based on the sole and joint presence of merging 
firms in local markets does not bring strong evidence for the "significant lessening of 
competition". This is consistent with our previous result of non-substantial price effects 
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and the fact that the Hungarian mergers only formed parts of large international 
transactions, and were not necessarily aimed to take over a strong local competitor. 
ESTIMATING ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
We now check whether alternative specifications of our estimated equation substantially 
modify our results. Table 11 shows the estimates of the eight merger effects for six different 
specifications. 
Table 11. 
Estimated effects for various specifications of Equation (1) 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
Dependent variable  Margin  Margin  Margin  Price  Log(Price) Markup 
Agip own  0,03  0,20  0,10  010  0,0002  0,0003 
Agip competitor  -0,01  0,15  0,15  0,15  0,0004  0,0004 
Esso own  1,49**  1,10*  1,78**  1,78**  0,0080** 0,0082** 
Esso competitor  1,05**  0,67**  1,24**  1,24**  0,0052** 0,0054** 
Lukoil own  1,98**  2,04**  1,95**  1,95**  0,0082** 0,0086** 
Lukoil competitor  0,19  0,20  0,20  0,20  0,0009  0,0010 
Jet own  -0,04  -0,16  -0,43  -0,43  -0,0003 -0,0004 
Jet competitor  0,39*  0,30  0,00  0,00  0,0004  0,0004 
Competitor controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time-county Fes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Within R2 0,17  0,19  0,27  0,99  0,99  0,46 
* significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level 
 
The first three columns demonstrate how additional control variables affect our 
results. Specification (I) is the basic form of Equation (1) with only the necessary treatment 
dummies and standard cross-section and time fixed effects. In specification (II), we add 
controls for local competitors (number and type of rival stations), and also add time-
county fixed effects in specification (III), which is the previously estimated and discussed 
Equation (2). These results demonstrate that the qualitative results do not change 
substantially, the statistically significant parameters are the Esso own and competitor 
effects and the Lukoil own effect. As the added controls are significant and the estimates 
provide economically sensible r e s u l t s ,  w e  i n c l u d e  b o t h  s e t s  o f  c o n t r o l s  i n  a l l  o f  o u r  
subsequent estimations. 
The last three columns demonstrate the results of estimating the merger effects on 
other dependent variables: the price and the markup. As neither of these variables are 
stationary, we should treat these estimation results with reservations. It is worth noting, 
however, that the regressions on price (specification IV) and the logarithm of price 
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(specification V) produce similar results to estimates from our Equation (2). In these 
specifications, we include the cost (wholesale price) on the right-hand side as a control.52 
Specification (VI) shows the change in the markup (the price-cost difference divided by the 
price, also called the Lerner-index). This estimation is also in line with the margin estimate 
f r o m  E q u a t i o n  ( 2 ) :  a  0 . 8  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  m a r k u p  f o r  E s s o  s t a t i o n  
corresponds to an increase of 13%.53 
 
SENSITIVITY OF THE RESULTS TO THE EFFECTIVE MERGER DATES 
Up to this point, we made strong assumptions on the effect mechanism of the mergers. 
First, we assumed that the effective merger date – that is the date the merging firms 
actually change their business and pricing policies – can be observed by the researcher, 
which is hardly ever the case. Typically, the only public information concerns the clearance 
date of the merger after which the merging firms are allowed to coordinate their business 
policies, but the change in firm's actual pricing may take several months. Some observable 
information may be available on firing managers or on rebranding decisions, but these are 
imperfect proxies of the effective merger date.54 Second, we assumed that the change in 
pricing policy is a sudden discrete jump that is simultaneously happening for all firms, but 
adjustments could be gradual and competitors may not instantaneously react. It is 
therefore crucial to test the sensitivity of our results with regards to these assumption. 
Initially, we analyze only the case when the two mergers takes effect at unobservable 
and potentially different dates, yet the effects are immediate. In our application, we 
estimate the merger effects in Equation (2) by gradually changing the effective merger date 
month-by-month from the first week of August 2007 till April 2008 for the Agip/Esso 
merger, and from the first week of March 2007 till March 2008 for the Lukoil/Jet 
merger.55 
Figures 3 and 4 show the own and competitor effects for Agip/Esso and then 
Lukoil/Jet for a range of effective merger dates, keeping the respective other effective 
                                                        
52In specification (IV), the estimated cost parameter is not significantly different from 1, which 
signals an (almost) complete pass-through at the retail level. 
53 The average markup is about 6% at the retail level. 
54 In our case, the only information is that both Agip and Lukoil started to repaint the acquired 
stations in November 2007, but the brand of some stations was changed only several months 
later. 
55 Agip/Esso was cleared at 24-07-2007, Lukoil/Jet at 17-02-2007. 
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merger date constant at January 2008.56 We show only those estimates that are significant 
at 5%. 
Figure 3. 















































































                                                        
56 Changing the Agip/Esso effective merger dates does not change substantially the estimated 
effects for Lukoil and Jet and vice versa, so we do not show results for all possible pairs of 
effective merger dates.  
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In the case of the Agip/Esso merger, the own and competitor effects are always 
significant and positive for Esso, but never significant for Agip.57 For this merger, the 
choice of the effective merger date does not change the qualitative results, but the 
estimated effects almost double if the merger is assumed to make an effect six months half 
a year after clearance rather than immediately. In the case of the Lukoil/Jet merger, 
however, we find only negative Lukoil competitor effects with effective merger dates before 
June 2007 and only positive Lukoil own effects with effective merger dates after this time. 
Therefore, for the second merger we may reach different qualitative conclusions if the 
effective merger date lies close to the clearance date, and the quantitative changes can be 
higher as well (the Lukoil own effect almost triples if effective merger date is December 
2007 instead of June 2007). We see that all effects increase if we start to move the effective 
merger date from the clearance date, and the point estimates reach their peaks between 
December 2007 and February 2008. 
We may use the above results for a speculative reasoning on the effective merger date. 
If the treatment indeed causes a discrete and immediate price increase and there are no 
other shocks affecting the industry, then the estimates for the assumed effective merger 
dates should be increasing before the actual effective merger date and decreasing after. 
Therefore, if we observe a (statistically significant) peak in the pattern of estimated merger 
effects then the date of this peak can be a candidate for the effective merger date. This is 
what we have done in Section 7 by pinning down both effective merger dates to January 
2008 and even these estimates showed negligible price effects for both mergers. Note that 
one should be cautious with this approach of selecting the effective date, but we can use 
the results to find an upper bound for effects of a merger. 
We now turn to the second potential issue, namely that the change due to the merger 
can be gradual, because of lengthy adjustment periods or differences in firms' reaction 
time. In this case, some observations fall in an intermediate period, and it might be 
beneficial to exclude this "window" period from the before-after comparisons.58 In our 
application, we estimate Equation (2) by excluding a window starting from September 
2007 for the Agip/Esso merger and July 2007 for the Lukoil/Jet merger,59 and change the 
end of the window month-by-month till March 2008. 
                                                        
57 The own effect is also always larger than the competitor effect, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
58 For the same reasons, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) estimate merger effects by leaving out 
observations within 3 months of the clearance date. 
59 If we start the Lukoil/Jet window before June 2007, only the Lukoil competitor effects will be 
significant. 
  29  
Figures 5 and 6 show the significant effects (at 5%) of the respective merger for 
different window end dates, by keeping the other effective merger date at January 2008. 
The qualitative results do not change significantly on whether we include a window period 
or not: the set of significant effects remain the same and the effects are always larger when 
fewer observations from 2007 belong to the "after treatment" regime. 
Figure 5. 
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So far, we estimated and compared the average price differential between stations in 
treatment and control groups for the entire "before merger" and "after merger" regimes. 
We can gain a further insight on the timing of the mergers' impact by estimating this price 
differential for smaller time period (for example weeks or months). Although these 
estimates cannot be interpreted in a standard before-after comparison, the evolution of 
these differentials might give an additional indication on when and how the firms started 
to price differently. Note however, that it is not the pricing dynamics of the affected and 
n o n - a f f e c t e d  s t a t i o n s  t h a t  w e  e s t i m a t e  h e r e ,  s o  t h i s  m e t h o d  s h o u l d  b e  s e e n  a s  o n l y  
complementary to other approaches disentangling the effect mechanism of the two 
mergers. 
In our application, we estimate the monthly price differentials for the stations of the 
four merging firms and of their competitors with the specification of Equation (2). For the 
firms affected by the respective merger, we normalize the monthly price differentials to 
zero in the month of the clearance (February 2007 for Lukoil/Jet and July 2007 for 
Agip/Esso). Figures 7 and 8 show the evolution of these differentials, where we plot only 
parameter estimates that are significant at 5%. 
Figure 7. 
Significant monthly differentials of treatment and control  
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Figure 8. 
Significant monthly differentials of treatment and control  










































These results show a visible difference emerging between the prices of treatment and 
control stations for both mergers from the end of 2007. In the case of the Agip/Esso 
merger, the price differentials are steadily increasing for the treatment group belonging to 
Esso own and competitor effects, which can be consistent with the gradual brand 
repositioning explanation we discussed earlier. In the case of stations used in estimating 
the Lukoil own effect, however, there is a discrete jump in the monthly price differentials 
between stations in the treatment and control group, which can indicate a sharp change in 
the firms' pricing policy. 
Finally, the estimation of monthly differences can help us to understand why some 
results are more sensitive to the choice of the effective merger date than others. We can 
use the fact that the standard difference-in-differences estimator of any merger effect is 
the difference between the average of the respective monthly differentials in months before 
and after the effective merger date. For example, as the monthly differential is almost 
never significant in the case of Jet, the difference-in-differences estimator robustly shows 
zero Jet own and competitor effects to all effective merger dates; while the increase of Esso 
monthly differentials explains why we estimate larger Esso effects if the effective merger 
date lies further away from the clearance date. 
 
  32  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper showed how to separate the ex post effects of simultaneous mergers on the 
prices of buyer and seller firms and their competitors. We exploit variation in the 
combination of affected firms' presence in distinct local markets to identify and estimate 
these effects by difference-in-differences methods. The separation of these effects enables 
us the testing of previous theoretical predictions of the merger literature explaining how 
the firms' different role in the merger may result in different price changes after the 
merger. 
As an application, we used a sufficiently rich panel database of station-based prices to 
analyze two almost simultaneous mergers in the Hungarian retail gasoline market. We 
concluded that a positive but negligible price effect can be attributed to both mergers, but 
one merger resulted in higher prices for the buyer firm's stations only, while the other 
increased prices of seller's stations and of its competitors. We also checked whether these 
results were sensitive to the (unobservable) dates when the mergers effectively changed 
the firms pricing, and found that our qualitative implications robustly emerge. 
Our method for separating the different price effects of mergers can be applied to any 
merger where there is some variation in the activities of the affected firms among distinct 
local markets (or in some cases, among distinct products). Therefore, given appropriate 
data one could use this approach in the ex post evaluation of airline, hospital or 
supermarket mergers, which typically attract public and political attention. The method 
can also be modified to study research questions emerging from the specific needs of a 
policy case. In our application, for example, we could have easily studied how the mergers 
affected the pricing of stations owned by vertically integrated companies and individual 
stations differently by appropriately selecting the local markets identifying this effect. 
In the future, we plan to complement our database with data on driving distances 
between stations. This feature will allow us to fine-tune the local market approach we have 
been working with, and check the robustness of our results in this respect. We can also add 
a further set of station characteristics to control for additional services like dining or car 
wash facilities, which could shed further light on the competition between leading brands 
offering a full range of services and discount stations supplying only gasoline. 
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